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Science and Politics:
The Possible Regulation of Cancer
Promoters
by Jerry R. WiIliams* and William L. Clark*
To address the problems associated with the
regulation of tumor promoters, one must recognize
that a regulatory agency's actions in the for-
mulation of policy redound from a matrix of
political, social and scientific pressures; each af-
fecting the other, and all influencing the final policy
outcome. Scientific understanding of the mecha-
nism(s) of tumor promotion plays a determinant role
in such interaction, for the selection of particular
biological tests as surrogates for human response to
chemical exposure provides the radical upon which
such interaction occurs, industry responding to the
legal, regulatory instrument that relies in turn on
scientific confidence in required tests. These parties
operate within the penumbra cast by political expe-
dients, environmental action groups, and special in-
terest lobbies whose concerns involve the cost of
testing, the availability of resources, the considera-
tion of particular chemicals of economic or symbolic
value, and other such aspects of regulatory policy or
its consequence. In examining the complex develop-
ment of policy for future regulation of tumor pro-
moters, we must attend first to the legal instrument
framing such regulations, assessing probable impact
on these various scientific, economic, social and poli-
tical factors.
Potential regulation of most tumor promoters
would fall within the regulatory ambit of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, specifically the
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA). As
with other regulatory acts, the making of public
policy, in this case concerning the manufacture and
use of chemicals, derives from two major concerns:
the attempt to achieve technical analyses of risks
and benefits as one base for regulation, and a gener-
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al judgment of social welfare or public safety as the
other.
Technical analysis and social judgment entwine
at the outset of TSCA, the Congress finding risk of
injury to health and environment from chemical ex-
posure (1), and then establishing as United States
policy the development of adequate data regarding
the effect of chemical substances and mixtures on
health and the environment in order to preclude
risk of injury by restrictions on manufacture and
use. Social judgment, basically a political process,
was intended to lie with the Congress, while techni-
cal analysis was to lie with the administrator of the
regulatory agency. This basic concept has failed due
to continued inexactitude of scientific risk assess-
ment, forcing technical assessment processes to be-
come quasi-political, dependent upon convention,
upon opinion and to a surprisingly large degree
upon social judgment within the agency and from
without. The U.S Environmental Protection
Agency, however, by its nature-and especially as
that nature is formed under TSCA-is a poor in-
strument for making or attempting to make social
judgment. The continued misperception of the EPA
as an instrument solely for technical assessment is
then a mistake, and although scientific truth is sup-
posed to underly and to shape the decisions that
agency renders, the uncertainty in scientific risk as-
sessment continues to be so great that the regula-
tory processes must be considered principally politi-
cal judgment rather than technical analysis. One
need only consider the posture assumed by the
present administration compared to that of its
predecessor to see that the same scientific facts re-
garding the regulation of specific environmental
agents can be used to assume two largely opposite
stances; the scientific facts remaining unchanged,
political perspective changing.
Concerning possible regulation of tumor pro-
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a-vis political judgment can best be understood by
such an illustration as the following. If most scien-
tists, upon evaluation of any test results presented
to them, would reach generally the same apprecia-
tion as to degree of risk an agent proffers, then
judgment would play a lesser role. On the other
hand, it is clear that the opposite condition gener-
ally applies for evaluating potential carcinogens, es-
pecially tumor promoters. It seems clearly evident
from the papers presented at this conference, for
example, that neither is there agreement for a bio-
logical basis for tumor promotion, nor is there sta-
tistical correlation between tests for tumor promo-
tion in laboratory animals and the human experi-
ence. Political judgment, then, plays a major part in
the potential regulation of tumor promoters. The
degree of social judgment-making versus technical
analysis going into regulatory decisions is deter-
mined in large part by the regulatory instrument
under which the administrator operates. The Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act as amended in 1958 stands
in polar opposition, in this regard, to TSCA.
Surely the best known example of congressional
exercise of social judgment relative to regulation is
the Delaney anti-cancer clause attached in 1958 to
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act prohibiting use of
any food additive determined to be carcinogenic in
animal or in man (2). Although a great deal of dis-
cussion continues to surround this legislative action,
the nature of the amendment, its simplicity and rigi-
dity, takes the inherent uncertainty of technical
analysis out of the administrative domain, and also
makes a clear determination as to risk; no risk
being acceptable. The Delaney principle, thus, obvi-
ates the problems associated with uncertainty in
risk versus benefit analysis of carcinogens. Since
the basis of such an amendment to regulation lies in
congressional social judgment-making, only congres-
sional exception can be made for carcinogens de-
monstrating benefit, e.g., the case of saccharin.
TSCA provides no posture similar to that fos-
tered by the Delaney principle. The policy estab-
lished in Section 2 of the act is one of regulating
"chemical substances and mixtures which present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment; the administrator being charged with
evaluating risk versus benefit of chemical exposure
creating possibility of "serious or widespread harm
to human beings." The administrator's determina-
tion of acceptable risk, a technical analysis occur-
ring within the economic-politico-social judgment
matrix, ultimately assumes an acceptable scientific
data base. Whatever the arguments for or against
congressional social judgment-making that results
in actions such as the Delaney principle, the Presi-
dent's Scientific Advisory Committee Panel on
Chemicals and Health notes "that it seems to be the
very lack of information plus an implied threat ...
which has led Congress to take social judgment-
making into their own hands" (3). The implications
for TSCA regulation of tumor promoters rest in the
inherent assumption of that act that conclusive sci-
entific data can drive administrative decision-
making toward that goal.
The problems of regulating any chemical based
on one or more scientific tests is one of answering
two questions concerning surrogation. The first
question is whether the test employed is an appro-
priate surrogate for exposed human populations,
that is, to ask whether the biology of the effect mea-
sured is a surrogate for the pathogenic process in
human beings. The second, and the more important,
question is to ask whether the test is predictive of
human hazard; the answer to this question being a
statistical association independent of theoretical bio-
logical considerations. An approach to these two
questions is illustrated best by considering a widely
used test for prediction of potential carcinogenic ha-
zard, the Ames assay.
The Ames assay, measuring mutation in bacteria,
has been accepted and is widely used due to two
factors. First, the test measures an endpoint be-
lieved to be germane to cancer, i.e., mutation. It
may be that mutation per se is not the cancer-initi-
ating event; indeed recently some have speculated
that other events, for example the induction of
transposition of genetic elements, could be the criti-
cal event. But in the continued use of the Ames as-
say, the fact that the exact endpoint may not be the
most critical event is not a disqualifying factor due
to a second and more important fact that for the
Ames assay, whatever the endpoint measured, the
predictive value is high (4). Agents that produce mu-
tation in the Ames test tend to produce cancer in
animals, and agents that produce cancer in animals
tend to produce cancer in man. This direct theme,
though imperfect in many specific examples, is
strong enough to override caveats and objections
that the various extrapolations for specific chemi-
cals are flawed. To approach the same questions for
predicting the potential human hazard from tumor
promoters is immensely more difficult, not only
from the viewpoint that there is little agreement on
the critical biological action of tumor promoters, but
also due to an almost complete absence of human
data on which to base extrapolations for the few
tests now used to evaluate potential human hazard.
The exact biological basis for cancer promotion is
not known. Tumor promoters are usually defined
operationally as agents given subsequent to "cancer
initiators" in selected animal systems that increase
the incidence of tumors or accelerate their appear-
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ance. The search for the critical molecular and cellu-
lar event(s) in promotion has been intensive and has
led to a compendium of effects produced in vivo and
in vitro by archetypal promoters such as TPA. Most
scientists, however, would agree in general with
Farber who summarizes "at present it is impossible
to relate the findings in vitro to chemical carcino-
genesis in vivo" (5). Thus deprived of knowledge of
the critical event, it is impossible to attempt to ex-
trapolate from surrogate test systems to potential
human hazard on the basis of common molecular or
cellular etiology.
The second question, that of confidence in extra-
polation based on statistical associations from the
outcome of "promoter" tests to known promotion of
human cancer, cannot be answered at all; there is no
human cancer data that can be clearly ascribed to
the act of a promoter. Clearly, there are several ex-
amples of synergism between carcinogens that ele-
vate human cancer rates, but none of these carcino-
gens can be classified solely as a cancer promoter.
As an example of such synergism, consider the in-
teraction in psoriatics treated with x-rays and sub-
sequently with oral psoralen and long-wavelength
ultraviolet light (PUVA therapy). Stern et al., ob-
served that such patients who had experienced x-
ray treatment even 5 years or more before PUVA,
evidenced elevated incidence of squamous cell carci-
nomas (6). PUVA therapy is a mutagenic treatment
in the Ames test and other simple systems, so it is
difficult to interpret these human data in terms of
initiators or promoters despite the clear synergism.
This clearly illustrates in a specific way the more
general problem of applying a simple initiator-pro-
moter scheme to human carcinogenesis produced by
multiple and sequential exposures. It seems much
more useful to consider this simple dichotomy as a
subclass of interactive carcinogens, perhaps a very
rare subclass.
Even if these formidable scientific problems of
technical assessment of tumor promoters could be
solved, regulation under TSCA is by its nature a
lengthy and complicated task, even for con-
sideration of known human carcinogens. Table 1
lists all specific chemicals or agents regulated by
the U.S. EPA under TSCA from the act's inception
in 1976 through October 1981. Asbestos, for an
example, has long been known to be a human
carcinogen, and the fact that it has not yet been
regulated in a final manner illustrates most clearly
that even an agent for which conclusive and
scientifically sound data exist as to its hazard for
exposed human beings, political debate comparing
potential social benefit with the degree of hazard
can retard and even stop regulation.
Thus it seems that there is no rigorous scientific
system of tests that will permit a meaningful pre-
diction of human hazard from tests of a potential
cancer promoter. If the promoter alone can produce
cancer in the long-term, whole animal bioassay, then
indeed it could, like any other carcinogen, be evalu-
ated by standard techniques. On the other hand, if
the agent will only produce increased cancer inci-
dence after treatment with an "initiator," the labo-
ratory scientist is hard put to devise an animal
model that could be a surrogate for an "initiated"
general human population. Lacking such an animal
system that would be acceptable through some de-
gree of scientific consensus to represent "initiated"
human populations in a meaningful way, it is diffi-
cult to imagine the extrapolation from any other
system to human hazard.
In summary, it appears that no acceptable data
base exists that will permit even the smallest
amount of confidence for the extrapolation from any
system now used to measure promotion to the pre-
dicting of potential human hazard from cancer in-
duction. That is not to say that TPA, for instance,
could not be regulated, but it does say that even for
this well tested agent the regulatory decision would
Table 1. Chemicals regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under TSCA (1976-1981).
Chemical Type of test data available Action taken
Chlorofluorcarbons (CFC) Depletion of ozone layer; implied increase in human skin cancer Prohibition of aerosol
use (3/17/78)
Polychlorinated biphenyls Animal carcinogen; accumulation in human beings Banned (5/31/79)
(PCB) and the environment
Asbestos Human carcinogen Proposed commercial use
restriction; no final action
TCDD In animals; acute toxicity and reproductive Restriction on storage
toxicity; carcinogenesis; suggestion of reproductive toxicity and disposal of waste
and cancer in human (5/19/80)
Polybrominated biphenyls Animal reproductive toxicity; mutagenicity Required notification of
(PBB) manufacture or import
(10/24/80)
Seven new chemicals Varied low level tests Additional testing requested;
chemicals withdrawn
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be one of establishing policy based on general con-
cepts, not on rigorous extrapolation from well de-
fined and predictive test systems. This in turn
means that a new chemical for which there is no a
priori reason to believe to be a cancer promoter
would probably not be tested in multiple, short-
term bioassays now used. Even if such a chemical
were so tested, and produced positive results, it is
unlikely that the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency under TSCA would or could take regula-
tory action that could successfully withstand legal
challenge.
In conclusion, it seems best to state that current
scientific knowledge and testing technology does
not permit the prediction of human hazard of a
given, putative cancer promoter with any degree of
rigor. The absence of scientific rigor implies in turn
that politics in both the smaller and larger sense
will determine whether any promoter can be or will
be regulated. Thus the question is not whether any
scheme, scientific or political, produces a prediction
of hazard, but whether that prediction has any use-
ful application to human carcinogenesis. For those
who propose that certain extant testing schemes
can or will predict human carcinogenic hazard, we
must be like Hotspur in the first part of Henry IV
who, upon hearing Glendower brag that "I can call
spirits from the vasty deep," replied "Why so can I
or so can any man/ But will they come when you do
call them."
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